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LABOR LAW-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURT 
To VACATE AN "UNLAWFUL" ORDER OF THE NLRB-Respondent, representing 
a labor organization, petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for 
certification as the exclusive bargaining agent of a group of professional 
employees pursuant to section 9 of the amended National Labor Relations 
Act.1 After a hearing the Board ordered that nine non-professional em-
ployees be included in the bargaining unit.2 Section 9(b) (1)3 expressly 
prohibits the inclusion of non-professional employees in a professional 
unit unless a majority of the professional members vote for inclusion in 
such unit. The Board refused to take a vote among the professional 
employees, and proceeded directly to order an election to determine if 
respondent's organization was the preferred bargaining agent. Respondent's 
organization was elected, and the Board gave its certification. Respondent 
then brought this suit in the district court, asking that the Board's certi-
fication be set aside because of the inclusion of the professional employees 
in the bargaining unit without their consent. The members of the Board 
moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The district court denied the 
motion,4 and this action was affirmed by the court of appeals.5 On certiorari 
to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, two justices dissenting. 
A federal district court has jurisdiction of an original suit to vacate an 
order of the NLRB made in excess of its delegated powers and contrary 
to a specific prohibition in the act. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). 
A party aggrieved by an order of the Board has two possible courses 
of action open to him. He may seek review under section 10(£) of the act 
by filing a petition in a United States court of appeals, or he may, in 
some types of cases, obtain review by an independent suit in a United 
States district court.6 It is well settled that orders of the Board under 
161 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1953) §159. 
2 Principal case at 186. 
3Section 9(b) provides in part: " ..• That the Board shall not (1) decide that any 
unit is appropriate ... if such unit includes both professional employees and employees 
who are not professional employees unless a majority of such employees vote for inclusion 
in such unit .... " 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1953) §159(b). 
4 Kyne v. Leedom, (D.C. D.C. 1956) 148 F. Supp. 597. 
5 Leedom v. Kyne, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 249 F. (2d) 490. 
6See 158 A.L.R. 1339 (1945) for an exhaustive review of the authorities prior to 
1946 with respect to these two modes of review. 
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section 9(b) of the act certifying collective bargaining agents may not 
be reviewed under section 10(£).7 A fortiori, review of orders of the Board 
which are preliminary steps to the certification of a bargaining representa-
tive may not be obtained under section 10(£).8 This result has been ex-
plained on the ground that neither certifications nor orders preliminary 
to certification are final orders. 9 A more thorough explanation would be 
that Congress intended to subordinate the interests of aggrieved parties 
in piecemeal review to the higher value of preventing delay in the collective 
bargaining process.10 On the other hand, it is also well settled that the 
validity of certifications or preliminary rulings may be reviewed as an 
incident of an appeal under section 10(£) from an order of the Board 
requiring a party to cease and desist from engaging in an "unfair labor 
practice."11 
The question whether review of NLRB certification orders or prelimin-
ary rulings may be had in an independent suit in a federal district court 
had not been authoritatively examined by the Supreme Court prior to the 
principal case.12 Some lower courts have answered this question in the 
negative on the ground that the provisions for review in section 10(£) are 
complete and exclusive,13 while others have upheld the jurisdiction of the 
district court.14 The impact of the principal case on these lower court 
decisions is open to debate. Although the relief asked by the plaintiff in 
the instant case was that the district court set aside die order of the 
Board, this question concerning district court jurisdiction usually arises 
in the setting where an injunction is sought.15 It would seem, however, 
that the difference in the relief asked in these cases reflects only the stage 
7 AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 
U.S. 146 at 151 (1941). 
s Cf. NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 308 U.S. 413 (1940). 
9 United Employees Assn. v. NLRB, (3d Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 875 at 876. See also 
Ames Baldwin Wyoming Co. v. NLRB, (4th Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 489. 
10 See Madden v. Brotherhood and Union of Transit Employees, (4th Cir. 1945) 147 
F. (2d) 439 at 443-444; New Bedford Loomfixers' Union v. Alpert, (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 
F. Supp. 723 at 726. 
11 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, note 7 supra; NLRB v. Whittier Mills Co., 
(5th Cir. 1940) Ill F. (2d) 474. 
12 See Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697 at 699 (1945); AFL v. NLRB, 
note 7 supra, at 412. Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 
320 U.S. 297 (1943), which was cited by •both the majority and dissenting opinions in the 
principal case, involved judicial review of a National Mediation Board order of certifica-
tion under the Railway Labor Act. 
13 E.g., Millis v. Inland Empire Council, (D.C. Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 539, affd. on 
other grounds, 325 U.S. 697 (1945); Zimmer-Thomson Corp. v. NLRB, (S.D. N.Y. 1945) 
60 F. Supp. 84. 
14 E.g., Farmer v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, (D.C. Cir. 1953) 211 
F. (2d) 36, cert. den. 347 U.S. 943 (1954); Klein v. Herrick, (S.D. N.Y. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 
417; A.F.L. v. Madden, (D.C. D.C. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 943. 
15 See cases cited in notes 13 and 14 supra. 
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which has been reached by the Board in supervising the collective bargain-
ing process, and does not introduce any materially different considerations 
in regard to the question of the propriety of district court jurisdiction.16 
In this light, it is reasonably to be anticipated that the principal case will 
be interpreted to allow district court review only of such orders of the 
Board as are "unlawful"11 and such as work "irreparable injury" to the 
plaintiff.18 The crucial question left open, however, is what substantive 
content should be attributed to these standards. The term "unlawful" 
may be given a meaning broad enough to include all actions of the Board 
in excess of its delegated powers. Yet all the limitations imposed on review 
in the circuit courts under section 10(£), as well as the underlying reasons 
for them, would be rendered ineffectual if an aggrieved party need only 
file its petition in a district court to avoid them.19 On the other hand, 
the term "unlawful" may be taken to include actions by the Board in 
direct contravention of express statutory prohibition. Indeed, the facts 
of the principal case would directly support this construction.19a It would 
seem that the term "unlawful" could properly be extended to include 
orders of the Board which are otherwise patently in excess of its delegated 
powers.20 Although the "unlawful" action of the Board, as thus defined, 
may by its very nature give rise to an "irreparable injury," no matter how 
strictly the latter term is construed, it should not be supposed that this 
will always be so. It is no doubt implicit in the concept of "irreparable 
16 Thus, for example, if the bargaining process had advanced to a point where the 
Board was holding a 11.earing on an alleged unfair labor practice by the wrongfully 
certified labor union, the same questions as to ,the propriety of district court jurisdiction 
would have arisen as were involved in the principal case. 
11 Limiting review in the district court to cases involving "unlawful" Board action 
has been suggested by the Supreme Court in Inland ·Empire District Council v. Millis, 
325 U.S. 697 at 700 (1945); AFL v. NLRB, note 7 supra. This limitation has been applied 
in a number of lower court decisions. See, e.g., De Pratter v. Farmer, (D.C. Cir. 1956) 
232 F. (2d) '74; Farmer v. United Electrical, Radio &: Machine Workers, note 14 supra. 
18 See, e.g., Pratt v. Stout, (8th Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 172; AFL v. Madden, note 14 
supra; Precision Casting Co. v. Boland, (W.D. N.Y. 1936) 13 F. Supp. 877. 
19 While the Taft-Hartley Act was in its committee stage the House Bill, ~vhich 
made provision for review of certifications in ,the circuit courts, was prevailed over by 
the Senate Bill, which omitted any such provision. H. Rep. 510, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 
56-57 (1947). The reason why the Senate Bill prevailed is undoubtedly because ailowing 
review of certifications would bring intolerable delays which could only result in indus-
trial strife. See Minority Report, H. Rep. 245, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 94 (1947). 
19a See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Leedom, (D.C. D.C. 1959) 27 U.S. LAW 
WEEK 2517, where the district court held in an injunction action by the employer that 
it had no jurisdiction to review the NI.;RB's determination in representation proceedings 
that certain workers were not supervisors. One of the grounds upon which the court 
distinguished the principal case was that there ,the "unlawful" action of the Board was 
in contravention of an express statutory prohibition, while in the case under consideration 
the alleged unlawful action merely involved a matter of statutory interpretation. 
20 As, for example, orders of the Board which constitute a departure from due 
process of law. International Brotherhood v. NLRB, (E-D. Mich. 1940) 41 F. Supp. 57. 
See also Inland Empire District Council v . .Millis, note 17 supra. 
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injury" that the plaintiff is unable to obtain review under section 10.21 
This being so, the argument advanced by the principal case is appealing 
that a party aggrieved by the patently unlawful actions of the Board 
should not be left without a remedy.22 But it hardly seems possible that the 
unavailability of review in the circuit courts, of itself, justifies the inference, 
tacitly drawn by the Court in the principal case, that Congress intended 
that the district courts would retain jurisdiction. Such reasoning ignores 
the alternative conclusion that it may have been the intention of Congress 
to withhold the right to review by refusing to make provision for it. The 
considerations which led Congress to omit from section IO provision for 
review of certifications would clearly indicate that the major objectives of 
the NLRA were thought to be best served by avoiding as much as possible 
litigious interference with the collective bargaining process.23 It would 
seem, therefore, that the proper inference to be drawn solely from the 
unavailability of review in the circuit courts is not that Congress intended 
review in the district courts, but rather that Congress intended that the 
rights which it created should remain inchoate until a later stage in the 
bargaining process. On the other hand, if "irreparable injury" means, in 
addition to the unavailability of review under section IO, that the aggrieved 
party must be deprived of a substantial or crucial right,24 then it would seem 
that the undoubted policy of preventing delay becomes more obscured as 
the right of which the aggrieved party is deprived increases in substantiality. 
Adopting this stricter construction of "irreparable injury," it could be 
argued more convincingly that Congress in enacting the act remained silent 
in a belief that the district courts would retain jurisdiction. But notwith-
standing the foregoing analysis, the Supreme Court seems to have adopted 
the view that "irreparable injury" means little more than the unavailability 
of review when there has been a patently unlawful deprivation of a right, 
whether substantial or unsubstantial. 
Stephen B. Flood 
21 See, e.g., Heller Bros. Co. v. Lind, (D.C. Cir. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 862, cert. den. 300 
U.S. 672 (1937). It is probably true that an employer could seldom be "irreparably 
injured," since he could merely refuse to bargain and thereby elicit a cease and desist 
order which is reviewable under §10. An uncertified union clearly has no opportunity 
to obtain review under §10, since it may not be guilty of an "unfair labor practice." A 
certified union is probably in the same position for the reason that, even if it were to 
refuse to bargain, it is unlikely that an employer will petition the Board to make a 
finding of an "unfair labor practice," since it is presumptively ,to the employer's 
advantage to deal with nonrepresented employees individually. 
22 It ·has been suggested that the majority opinion in the principal case opens the 
door to district court review upon the allegation ,that the Board's action is based upon 
a "misinterpretation" of the statute. Principal case, dissenting opinion at 194, 195. It 
would seem, however, that the description as a "misinterpretation" of a refusal to heed 
an express statutory prohibition is exceedingly charitable. 
23 See note 19 supra. 
24 See Farmer v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, note 14 supra. 
